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Presuming an ageing population, every introduction of a pay-as-you-go scheme
causes intergenerational redistribution in favor of the ﬁrst generations and to the
burden of young and future generations. Using the concept of internal rates of
return we want to examine the extent to which the ﬁrst generations drew an intro-
ductory beneﬁt from the implementation of the German statutory long-term care
insurance as an unfunded system. Furthermore, a comparison between the internal
rates of return will show ﬁrstly to what extent diﬀerent generations are burdened
by having to redeem the implicit debt, and secondly which generations are involved
in paying back the introductory gain.
JEL classiﬁcation: I18; J10
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In contrast to the introduction of a fully funded system, every implementation of a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) type social security system encompasses an introductory beneﬁt for
the old, especially the oldest, generations. This fact can be exempliﬁed by the German
statutory long-term care insurance (LTCI) which was established as an unfunded system
in the year 1995. It constitutes the ﬁfth pillar of German social security following
pension, unemployment, health and accident insurance systems.
Unlike in a fully funded system, where beneﬁts are only granted after an upfront
period of capital accumulation, an unfunded system uses the contribution payments
for ﬁnancing the beneﬁts of the same period. Hence, at the time of implementing the
PAYG scheme, long-term care coverage for those already or soon in need of such care on
account of their age is ensured. A PAYG system is thus in favor of all those generations
who – at the time of implementation and in the years thereafter – are already receiving
beneﬁts without ever having contributed to the system.
However, this advantage for the ﬁrst generations generates an overall advantage of
the PAYG system only in case of a reasonable demographic development or economic
growth and labor market situation. Only if the implicit rate of return from the unfunded
scheme exceeds the one resulting from the alternative fully funded system (dynamically
ineﬃcient case), the implementation of a PAYG system eﬀectively renders a beneﬁt
for all generations. In the opposite case, i.e. in the dynamically eﬃcient case, every
implementation of an unfunded system induces both winning and losing generations, the
latter losing according to the extent to which the population ages. Hence, the greater
the proportion of the old population in relation to the young working population, the
more the working population has to contribute to LTCI to ﬁnance those in need of
long-term care. Despite the “revenue-orientated expenditure policy” as speciﬁed in the
Social Code, Book XI (Sozialgesetzbuch XI), this inevitably leads to an increase in the
contribution rate. Whilst the PAYG system on the one hand solves the problem of
ﬁnancing those already or soon in need of care on account of their age, it on the other
hand simultaneously imposes an implicit debt onto the system.
For the purposes of this paper, the intergenerational redistributive eﬀects for all
living and future cohorts through the enactment of the German LTCI are illustrated
using the concept of internal rates of return. The internal rate of return of LTCI for
a representative agent of a respective generation thus provides information concerning
the share of contribution payments to long-term care beneﬁts. In this context, the
so-called introductory beneﬁt of the old and oldest generations resulting from short or
non-existent net contribution phases as well as the implicit indebtedness of the system
resulting therefrom is to be determined. Furthermore, we want to trace the question
1of who has to pay for the windfall or introductory gain of the ﬁrst generations.1 In a
dynamically eﬃcient economy, the introductory gain, i.e. the initial transfer payments
to the old and oldest generations at the introduction of LTCI, equals the present value of
the perpetual implicit taxes on all subsequent generations. The implicit tax payment is
given by the diﬀerences in internal rates of return of an alternative fully funded system
and the unfunded system (see Feldstein (1995)).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the concept and the method
of measuring the internal rate of return. The implicit rates of return of the respec-
tive generations aﬀected diﬀerently by LTCI on account of their age are speciﬁed in
section 3. In this context, it is presumed that the contribution rate of 1.7 percent is
maintained at a constant level over time.2 This allows to determine the introductory
beneﬁt resulting from the implementation of the LTCI as intended by the legislator in
a ﬁrst step. In a second step, the share of implicit debt each cohort has to redeem can
be pinpointed. Section 4 accounts for the necessary adjustments in the contribution
rate due to the demographic development, thereby yielding the actual internal rates of
return of living and future cohorts. A comparison with the internal rates of return of
an alternative funded scheme further shows which generations have to bear the costs
of the windfall gain of the ﬁrst generations.
2 Method, projecting net beneﬁts and the internal rate
of return
The implicit interest rate of LTCI can be expressed as the internal rate of return of
a series of cash outﬂows and inﬂows. Since the introduction of the PAYG system
strikes individuals at diﬀerent points in time of their life-cycle, all payment-streams
ﬂowing from a representative individual of a respective cohort, as well as the LTCI
over the remaining life-cycle have to be determined in order to be able to compute the
corresponding internal rates of return. For simplicity we stipulate an average individual,
diﬀerentiating only between male and female.
For the following calculations, the year 1995 serves as the base year, whereby all
contribution and transfer payments that have ﬂown from the time of the introduction
of LTCI are taken into account. The average payment-ﬂows of every single cohort over
the whole life-cycle can be expressed as the present value of the net payments (NPV),
1Whilst the term introductory beneﬁt is not a ﬁxed expression, the notion windfall gain is well
deﬁned in economic literature. The latter goes back to Feldstein (1995) and Sinn (2000), both giving
a formal proof for it.
2In the German statutory LTCI the contribution rate is ﬁxed to 1.7 percent of contribution income.
2i.e. the diﬀerence between contribution and transfer payments. This net present value
of an individual of generation k in the birth year k can formally be deﬁned as follows,
with the index j serving as a means of diﬀerentiate between a male (j = m) and a










s,k(1 + r)k−s. (1)
z
j
s,k represents the average net payment of an individual of generation k in the year
s, and c
j
s,k stands for the cohort-speciﬁc survival rate of an individual, with the latter
satisfying 0 ≤ c
j
s,k ≤ 1 and c
j
k+D+1,k = 0.4 The maximum life is set to D = 100, and the
average net payment is discounted to the base year with the exogenous and constant
interest rate r.
The average net payment in period s of an agent born in k ≤ s, is the sum of the









Concerning the average age-speciﬁc net payments I = 9 diﬀerent contribution and
transfer types are considered: on the side of the contribution payments we distinguish
between payments from unemployment support, payments from retirees and payments
from employees.5 On the side of long-term care beneﬁts, the transfers are detailed
into the care levels 1 to 3 as well as into the categories out-patient and in-patient
beneﬁts.6 h
j
s−k,i,s > 0 (< 0) stands for the corresponding contribution payment (the
corresponding transfer payment) of an individual of age s−k. The following restriction
must hold for the base year t as well as for all the following years up to the projection
year τ, with the latter corresponding to the year 2003 (the last year for which the
requisite macroeconomic data can be obtained). The sum of age-speciﬁc individual
payments, weighed with cohort size, must equal the corresponding macroeconomic
3The following notation and methodical description is derived from Bonin (2000). Small letters
express per-capita variables, capital letters denote aggregate variables.
4For calculating the cohort-speciﬁc survival rate, the mortality table 2001/2002 of the Federal Sta-
tistical Oﬃce has to be adapted for all living and future generations subject to a higher life expectancy.
The latter is adjusted according to the 5th variant of the 10th coordinated population projection of
the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (see Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a)). The demographic aging process is
thus adequately illustrated over time.
5Concerning the contribution payments we consider the employer’s as well as the employee’s share
of payments. Furthermore, we account for the Kinderber¨ ucksichtigungsgesetz enacted on January 1
st,
2005 which raises the share of long-term care contribution payment by 0.25 percentage points for all
childless employees.
6This classiﬁcation in beneﬁts as determined in the Social Code, Book XI is supposed to give
consideration to the diﬀerent degrees of the need of long-term care.













s,k, for t ≤ s ≤ τ, (3)
must hold, with P
j
s,k j ∈ (m,f), denoting the number of male, respectively female,
survivors of the corresponding cohort in period s.7
The individual net payments for the projection year τ as well as for all subsequent
years s remain to de determined. For this purpose, the age-speciﬁc contribution pay-
ments and transfer receipts have to be extrapolated with the annual growth rate of the
economy g, whereby we assume the latter to be 1.5 percent p.a. in all our calculations.
This especially means, that the nominal speciﬁed long-term care beneﬁts as legislated
in 1995 are adjusted annually by 1.5 percent. On the basis of this constant and time
invariant productivity growth rate we presume that all agents who reach the age s−k
will experience the same long-term care policy as the representative (s−k)-year-old in





s−k,i,τ(1 + g)s−τ, for s > τ. (4)
Hence, all information necessary for determining past and future payment-ﬂows among
a representative individual of generation k and the LTCI are at hand. The internal rate
of return is the discount rate that balances the present value of long-term contribution












k)k−s ≡ 0. (5)
The internal rate of return of a respective cohort is thus computed by an iterative
algorithm. All internal rates of return listed in the following sections are referred to in
real value terms.
7Methodically, the fulﬁllment of this restriction is achieved as follows: In a ﬁrst step, the relative
age-speciﬁc contribution and transfer position of a representative agent ζ
j
s−k,i,s of the corresponding
contribution type, respectively transfer type, i is determined on micro level. In a second step, this
proﬁle of relative per-capita contribution payments and transfer receipts by age is multiplied by a non-
age-speciﬁc benchmarking factor, denoted by λi, thus assuring that equation (3) is satisﬁed. Formally,










for s ≤ τ.
43 Results from measuring the internal rate of return and
the introductory beneﬁt
Calculations concerning the internal rate of return will be carried out for the cohort
born in 1895, i.e. at the time of the enactment of LTCI in 1995 the 100-year-olds, up
to the cohort born in 2025. Yet, it is only the generation born in 1975, i.e. the 20-year-
olds in 1995, whose payment-ﬂows actually comprise the whole of the life-cycle.8 This
generation is the ﬁrst one not to have an introductory beneﬁt through the enactment of
the PAYG system, as this generation has to complete the full contribution and transfer
phase. Consequently, the 20-year-olds in 1995 constitute the benchmark case to which
all other implicit rates of return must be compared. As this section is to quantify
the introductory beneﬁt induced by the legislator, we assume that the contribution
rate of 1.7 percent equally applies for all generations in all future years.9 In the next
step, this enables us to illustrate the share of implicit debt with which each generation
is burdened. As mentioned earlier on, LTCI induced an introductory beneﬁt for all
generations already belonging to the circle of potential recipients of long-term care
transfers, as well as all those generations who did and do not have to pass through
the entire net contribution phase. On average, men of an age of 69 years, women of
an age of 64 years belong to net transfer recipients. Compared to the men, women
only pay about half of the contribution payments, yet they receive considerably more
long-term care beneﬁts. The latter is due to a higher life-expectancy and the more
extensive transfers resulting therefrom. Figure 1 displays the age- and sex-speciﬁc
contribution payments and transfer receipts of the years 1995, 1996, 1997 and of the
projection year 2003 in current prices.10 Conditional on the fact that the contribution
rate of LTCI was 1 percent in the period from January, 1st 1995 to June, 31st 1996,
the contribution payments for the years 1995 and 1996 are relatively low. Only when
the long-term entitlements were extended to cover in-patient beneﬁts on July, 1st 1996,
8For simplicity, we neglected the fact that the 0- to 19-year-olds are – although only to a small
extent – net recipients. Only considering the payment-ﬂows from an age of 20 has the advantage that
the stream of payment-ﬂows over the remaining life-cycle changes sign just once. Multiple rates of
return are thus ruled out.
9The nominal long-term care beneﬁts as legislated in 1995 are adjusted annually by the growth
rate of the economy, i.e. 1.5 percent. See also equation (4). This leads to an equal treatment of all
generations on the expenditure side and thus to an adequate comparison of the internal rates of return
of diﬀerent cohorts.
10In order to generate the age- and sex-speciﬁc proﬁles macro data stemming from the national
accounts 2001 and 2003, see Statistisches Bundesamt (2001) and (2003b) as well as micro data are
necessary. The age-speciﬁc transfer proﬁles are generated through data we received on request from the
Federal Ministry of Health and Social Security. The proﬁles for the contribution payments of employees
and the unemployed are derived from the German Income and Expenditure Survey (Einkommens- und
Verbrauchsstichprobe) 1998. The contribution proﬁles for the retirees are taken from the Association
of German Retirement Insurance Organizations (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherer) in VDR 1995
to 2001.
5Figure 1: Age- and sex-speciﬁc contribution and transfer proﬁles of the years 1995,
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the contribution rate was raised from 1 to 1.7 percent.
According to the average contribution and transfer proﬁles of the respective years,
all men born in 1925 and older and all women born in 1930 and older were already net
transfer recipients over their remaining life-cycle at the time of implementing LTCI. As
the long-term care beneﬁts overcompensate the contribution payments, these cohorts
all possess an inﬁnite rate of return:
im
k = ∞ for 1895 ≤ k ≤ 1925,
i
f
k = ∞ for 1895 ≤ k ≤ 1930.
Nevertheless, in order to indicate the extent of the introductory beneﬁt due to the
LTCI, the present values of the net transfers of the respective cohorts are speciﬁed in
the following. The net present value of the payment-ﬂows for the respective generations,
diﬀerentiated by sex, are determined according to equation (1) with the base year t now










s,k(1 + r)t−s. (1’)
6A woman born in 1930 receives net long-term care beneﬁts of about 13,600 Euro without
ever having made a net contribution. A woman of birth year 1925 is in similar position.
Comparing a male agent of the same cohort clearly shows that he is only beneﬁted by
about half of the net transfer receipts, namely 8,000 Euro. The introductory beneﬁt of
the 100-year-old agent in 1995 can be computed in the same way. With advanced age
of the individuals the net present values decrease. This is due to a shorter remaining
lifetime and thus to lower transfer receipts in absolute terms. The introductory beneﬁt
of the oldest living generation in 1995 amounted to 470 Euro of out-patient net long-
term care transfers.
Figure 2: Present value of the net transfers for the cohorts born in 1930, and 1925
















1930 1925 1920 1915 1910 1905 1900 1895























1925 1920 1915 1910 1905 1900 1895


















All cohorts belonging to the net contribution payers in 1995, which did not undergo
the whole of the net contribution phase, also enjoy an introductory beneﬁt. This
applies to all generations born in 1970 and older, since the net contribution phase is
only completely traversed by the cohort born in 1975 and younger. The closer a cohort
is to the end of its net contribution phase, the more it draws an advantage from the
implementation of the PAYG ﬁnanced LTCI. This can be illustrated by comparing the
internal rates of return of the oldest generation that still made a net contribution in
1995, i.e. the male generation 1930 and the female generation 1935, up to the youngest
net contributing cohort, i.e. the benchmark cohort 1975 (see Fig. 3). The introductory
beneﬁt thus results as the diﬀerence in the internal rate of return of the respective cohort






The ﬁrst internal rate of return based on a net contribution phase of four years is
that of a male agent born in 1930 and lies at about 28.4 percent. This is reduced to
12.4 percent for a male representative of the cohort 1935, who – compared to the agent
7Figure 3: Internal rate of return through implementing LTCI in 1995 under a
constant contribution rate
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cohort
i_male i_female
from the base year perspective directly 
by LTCI affected cohorts
from the base year perspective in future 
by LTCI affected cohorts
born in 1930 – goes through ten years of net contribution payments. A women also
born in 1935 – with, however, only a net contribution phase of ﬁve years – achieves
an internal rate of return of 30 percent through the enactment of LTCI. Due to the
longer net contribution phase, every subsequent generation yields a lower return on
their contribution payments and thus has a lower introductory beneﬁt. A man (a
woman) born in 1945 still receives an internal rate of return of 5.2 (10.6) percent, but
this is reduced to 2.4 (5.4) percent for a man (a woman) of cohort 1965. This, again, is
almost the return on contribution payments that the benchmark-cohort yields, which
amounts to 2.2 percent for a man and 4.8 percent for a woman.
Given that the contribution rate and the real term transfer level are carried forward
in all future periods as assumed here, all cohorts subsequent to the generation born





1975, ∀ k ≥ 1975. This is evident, since the constant contribution rate keeps
the return on the contributions on a ﬁxed level. Hence, implicitly assuming a static
population, no shifting in burdens takes place as all generations are confronted with an
identical contribution rate for the same expected long-term care beneﬁts.
However, reality is entirely diﬀerent: As the proportion of the old population in
relation to the young working population is increasing, the working population has to
contribute more to LTCI in order to ﬁnance those in need of long-term care. This leads
to continuously rising contribution rates, the rise in the contribution rate reﬂecting no
8more than the cost of ageing. In the following section the extent to which the respective
generations are involved in redeeming the implicit debt of LTCI can be speciﬁed with
the help of the internal rates of return. At this point, we want to refer to H¨ acker and
Raﬀelh¨ uschen (2005), who numeralize the implicit debt of the LTCI as a sustainability
gap.11 According to H¨ acker and Raﬀelh¨ uschen (2005), the sustainability gap amounts
to 32.1 percent of GDP 2003. In absolute terms, this corresponds to an implicit dept
of LTCI of almost 0.7 trillion Euro.
4 The internal rate of return of LTCI taking into account
the demographic development
In order to calculate the internal rate of return resulting from LTCI under the given
demographic development, the equations mentioned in section 2 have to be modiﬁed in
parts. The modiﬁcation is thus based on the budget restriction of LTCI. Despite the
fact that LTCI is subject to a revenue-orientated expenditure policy as deﬁned in the
Social Code, Book XI, the annual deﬁcits have to be balanced through adjustments in
the contribution rate. The adjustment factor for the contribution rate is determined for
the respective year by setting the expenditure into relation to the revenue. In the fol-
lowing, the indices 1 to 3 relate to the contribution types mentioned above(contribution
payments from unemployment support, contribution payments from retirees, and con-
tribution payments from employees) and the indices 4 to 9 relate to the six diﬀerent
types of transfer beneﬁts (out-patient transfers of the care levels 1 to 3 and in-patient




























If qs > 1 this implies a rise in the contribution rate of 100·(qs−1) percent compared to
the projection year. Formally this means that the contribution rate of the projection
year τ for all years s > τ has to be multiplied with a factor qs. Hence, the age-speciﬁc
contribution payments h∗





s−k,i,s(1 + g)s−τ for s > τ and i = 1,2,3, (7)
11The sustainability gap identiﬁes the deﬁcit in the intertemporal LTCI budget constraint arising
from continuation of current LTC policy. It measures the present value of all future revenues that are
lacking to cover the implicit LTC spending commitments.









The internal rate of return is in turn the discount rate that sets equation (1) – now












k )k−s ≡ 0. (9)
A comparison of the internal rate of return (i
j
k) under a constant contribution rate and
the internal rate of return under consideration of the deﬁcit-reassessed contribution rate
adjustment of a cohort k shows that a decrease in the implicit rates of return of LTCI
evolves (see Fig. 4). The deviation in the internal rates of return resulting therefrom
is solely due to the demographic development and thus due to the fact of having to
ﬁnance the cost of ageing. Hence, the share of implicit debt with which a generation is





Figure 4: Internal rate of return of LTCI taking into account the adjustments in the
contribution rate
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All cohorts born 1955 and older are barely aﬀected by the increases in the contri-
10bution rate occurring for the ﬁrst time in 2009.12 Hence, in 1995 a 40-year-old man is
confronted with a reduction in his internal rate of return of 0.72 percentage points, a
woman of the same age-group only has to take a reduction of 0.41 percentage points,
which must be ascribed to lower contribution payments. The younger a cohort the
bigger the impact of (future) increases in contribution rates on the internal rate of re-
turn. The respective generations not only have to pass through a longer phase of higher
contribution rates, but these contribution rates also carry on rising over time: starting
from 1.7 percent until 2008 the contribution rate rises continuously to its maximum
value of 3.9 percent in 2055. Hence, young and future cohorts are particularly aﬀected
by the contribution rate adjustments.
Compared to the hypothetical internal rate of return in the scenario of a constant
contribution rate, the internal rate of return of a man of the benchmark-cohort is now
reduced by almost 68 percent, namely from 2.2 percent to 0.7 percent. In contrast
to this, a woman of the same generation only has a reduction in her internal rate of
return of 18 percent, i.e. from 4.6 to 3.9 percent. The further this comparison is
taken into the future, the more signiﬁcant the impact of the rises in the contribution
rate on the level of the internal rate of return. Especially all the generations born
after 1975 (k > 1975) have substantial drawbacks in their implicit rates of return
compared to the benchmark-case. The internal rate of return is so far reduced that
it becomes negative for men of cohort 1995, namely from 2.25 under the constant
contribution rate to -0.15 percent when the necessary adjustments in the contribution
rate are made. Although the internal rate of return of a woman born in the same
year, all adjustments made, still amounts to 3 percent. This nevertheless constitutes
a reduction in the implicit interest rate of 37 percent compared to the benchmark
interest rate. In contrast with the constant returns to the contribution payments for
all cohorts subsequent to the benchmark-cohort – as illustrated in the previous section
–, the demographic development now has a clear impact on the implicit interest rates.
It provides an estimate for the share of implicit debt each generation has to redeem.
By means of comparing the internal rates of return of a respective generation, it is
not only obvious that the implicit rate of return diminishes according to demographic
development, it also becomes evident that every generation has to carry part of the
demographic aging burden – yet to diﬀerent degrees. Future generations are particularly
burdened by the demographic eﬀect, having to bare the implicit debt to a greater extent.
The last question to be answered refers to who is to pay back the introductory gain.
Provided the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, the diﬀerence in the internal rate of
return of an alternative funded system – the market interest rate r – and the implicit
rate of return of the PAYG system i
∗j
k is to be made out as an implicit tax, which is
12For the projection of the contribution rate, see H¨ acker and Raﬀelh¨ uschen (2005).
11Figure 5: The redemption of the introductory gain
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12imposed on all generations through the introduction of the PAYG scheme: (r − i
∗j
k ).
According to Sinn (2000), who provides a formal illustration, the introductory gain of
the ﬁrst generations is exactly equal to the perpetual implicit tax payments.13 Thus,




Assuming a real market interest rate of 3 percent,14 the redemption of the intro-
ductory gain is mainly undertaken by men of cohort 1955 and younger – except for
a marginal share paid by women of cohort 2000 and younger. This eﬀect becomes
stronger, the more the internal rate of return drops within the scope of the PAYG
system. While the male cohort of 1955 only pays back only a relatively small share
of the introductory gain, the share is already much higher for the subsequent genera-
tions. Thus, the implicit tax rises with an increase in aging of the population and only
levels oﬀ from the cohort 2015 onwards (see Fig. 5a). The fact that the male cohorts
born 1955 up to 1970 are participating in paying oﬀ the introductory gain, however,
also means that (although they still achieve the above mentioned introductory beneﬁt
resulting from shorter net contribution phases) they do not stand to make a real gain
any longer. Compared to an alternative funded system with a market interest rate r,
they can only achieve an internal rate of return of i∗m
k within the scope of the unfunded
LTCI, thus being eﬀectively worse oﬀ, as i∗m
k < r (∀ k ≥ 1955).
The reason for this seemingly exclusive redemption of the introductory gain through
men has to be ascribed to the fact that women beneﬁt by their in average lower contri-
bution payments to LTCI. A comparison to the risk-equivalent premiums, which would
result within the scope of a fully funded insurance scheme (given identical transfer re-
ceipts), shows that for women this would always lie above the contribution payments to
LTCI. The reason for this is that in the funded strategy, women have to pay exactly the
“price” for LTC transfers, corresponding to their risk proﬁle. Men, on the other hand,
would tend to be disburdened within the funded system. While they would have to
pay a risk equivalent premium, this would lie substantially beneath their contribution
payments to LTCI. This comparison also reveals the intragenerational redistribution
taking place within the LTCI between men and women. Figure 6 illustrates the ex-
pected development of the premium and contribution payments for a 20 year-old male
13See Sinn (2000), S. 394 ﬀ.
14For comparison, the calculation of the age- and sex-speciﬁc premiums with aging reserve underlies a
minimum nominal interest rate of 3.5 percent. See Bundesgesetzblatt (1996), Kalkulationsverordnung,
§4. This prescribed minimum interest rate, based on a precautionary principle, ensures a return on
premium payments of 3.5 percent even if the economy is in recession. Looking at the average eﬀective
nominal net interest rate of the private health care insurers of the last 15 years shows, however,
that the nominal interest rate amounted to almost 7 percent in average, see Verband der privaten
Krankenversicherung e.V. (2004). The assumption of a long-run real interest rate of 3 percent made
here therefore seems legitimate.
13Figure 6: Comparison of the annual sex-speciﬁc premium and the annual con-
tribution payment to LTCI of a 20-year-old female and male individual in the
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contribution payment to LTCI
and female individual in 2003.15 Over time, the premium – like the contribution pay-
ment to LTCI – rises by 1.5 percent according to the adjustment rate of the long-term
care transfers. Moreover, in the course of determining the contribution payments to
LTCI, the necessary adjustments in the contribution rate were taken into account.
The redistribution occurring in the unfunded LTCI can be exposed by looking at
average internal interest rates. This allows us to determine which generations are actu-
ally involved in paying back the introductory gain, disregarding any intragenerational
redistribution elements. An examination of the average internal rates of return (see
Fig. 5b) shows that all generations born in 1965 and younger are burdened with the
implicit tax payment. It is only the redistribution within LTCI that produces the eﬀect
that women – despite the aging of the population – barely come out worse with LTCI
than with the alternative funded system (compare Fig. 5a). Thus, intragenerational
redistribution to large parts overcompensates the implicit tax that would actually have
to be paid by women. Men, on the other hand, are burdened with a higher implicit tax
by the redistribution taking place in unfunded LTCI.
15All values are expressed in real purchasing power of the year 2003. For calculation of the sex-
speciﬁc premium it was assumed that the present value of all expected long-term care receipts over
the remaining life-cycle corresponds to the present value of all expected future premium payments.
The expected value of the transfer expenditures for every subsequent year results when the age-speciﬁc
transfers of a respective year are multiplied with the age-speciﬁc survival rates. The share, which
exceeds the running costs, the so-called aging reserve, was considered with a real interest rate of 3
percent. Basis for these calculations is the transfer proﬁle of the projection year.
145 Conclusion
Considering the example of the introduction of the German statutory long-term care
insurance, the intergenerational distribution eﬀect arising under an aging population
by the implementation of an unfunded system were illustrated using the concept of
internal rates of return. While the introduction of LTCI is to the beneﬁt of the old and
oldest generations, thus solving the problem of those already receiving long-term care
and those soon in need of such care on account of their age, it at the same imposes
an implicit debt onto the system. This is due to the demographic development. This
implicit debt has to be redeemed by all succeeding generations who have to put up
with increasing contribution rates.
By calculating internal rates of return for the respective cohorts, all redistributive
eﬀects through implementing LTCI could be clearly exposed. We distinguished between
the redemption of the implicit debt and the implicit tax for paying oﬀ the introductory




k ) is ﬁnanced by everyone,
though to a large extent by future generations (and this independent of whether the
individual is of male or female sex), the repayment of the introductory gain (r − i
∗j
k )
is apparently undertaken almost exclusively by men. This, however, is only due to the
fact of substantial sex-speciﬁc redistributive elements within the LTCI.
We thus ﬁnd a signiﬁcant intragenerational redistribution in LTCI to the beneﬁt
of women. The extent of this is such that, despite the demographic development,
female individuals of today’s young and future generations are only marginally worse
oﬀ within the unfunded LTCI than in an alternative funded system. Through this
redistribution, women are disburdened to such an extent that they barely net contribute
to paying back the introductory gain. Young and middle-aged men clearly lose through
the implementation of the LTCI on a PAYG basis. They not only have to put up
the intergenerational redistribution towards their parent generation, but also with the
intragenerational redistribution towards the female sex.
15References
Bonin, H. (2000). Generational Accounting in Theory and Practice. Springer, Berlin.
Bundesgesetzblatt (1996). Verordnung ¨ uber die versicherungsmathematischen Metho-
den zur Pr¨ amienkalkulation und zur Berechnung der Alterungsr¨ uckstellungen in der
privaten Krankenversicherung. Teil 1, Nr. 61. Bonn.
Feldstein, M. (1995). Fiscal Policies, Capital Formation, and Capitalism. European
Economic Review, 39:399–420.
H¨ acker, J. and Raﬀelh¨ uschen, B. (2005). Wider besseren Wissens: Zur Finanzierbarkeit
Demenzkranker in der Gesetzlichen Pﬂegeversicherung. Diskussionsbeitr¨ age, Institut
f¨ ur Finanzwissenschaft der Albert-Ludwigs-Universit¨ at Freiburg, Nr. 127.
Sinn, H.-W. (2000). Why a Funded Pension System is Useful and Why It is not Useful.
International Tax and Public Finance, 7:389–410.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2001). Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, Konten und
Standardtabellen, Hauptbericht 2001 Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3. Wiesbaden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a). Bev¨ olkerung Deutschlands bis 2050 - 10. koordinierte
Bev¨ olkerungsvorausberechnung. Wiesbaden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b). Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, Konten und
Standardtabellen, Hauptbericht 2003 Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.3. Wiesbaden.
Verband der privaten Krankenversicherung e.V. (2004). Die private Krankenver-
sicherung – Zahlenbericht 2003/2004. K¨ oln.
16Seit 2005 erschienene Beiträge 
 
No. 1    Christian Hagist/Norbert Klusen/Andreas Plate/Bernd Raffelhüschen 
    Social Health Insurance – the major driver of unsustainable fiscal policy? 
No. 2    Stefan Fetzer/Bernd Raffelhüschen/Lara Slawik 
    Wie viel Gesundheit wollen wir uns eigentlich leisten? 
No. 3    Oliver Ehrentraut/Matthias Heidler/Bernd Raffelhüschen 
En route to sustainability: history, status quo, and future reforms of the German public pension 
scheme? 
No. 4    Jasmin Häcker/Bernd Raffelhüschen 
Die Interne Rendite der Gesetzlichen Pflegeversicherung 
No. 5    Jasmin Häcker/Bernd Raffelhüschen 
Internal Rates of Return of the German Statutory Long-Term Care Insurance 
                           (Englische Fassung von Diskussionsbeitrag No. 4) 
 
 Forschungszentrum Generationenverträge 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg 
Bertoldstraße 17  
79098 Freiburg  
Fon 0761 . 203 23 54 
Fax  0761 . 203 22 90 
www.generationenvertraege.de 
info@generationenvertraege.de 
 
ISSN 1862-913X 